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THE AUTHORS' REPLY TO COMMENTARIES ON, AND
CRITICISMS OF THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR,
HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT'
H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel*
INTRODUCTION
We are happy to have the opportunity to respond to some of the comments
offered by our critics.2 Indeed, we are grateful for the criticism that hits the mark,
and much of it does. We wish only that we had been able to deal here in greater
detail and specificity with the points with which we agree and disagree, as well as
those we believe to be plain wrong. However the format - and the constraints of
time - are such that we will have to rely primarily on the book itself - and its
copious notes - to make our case for us. We hope on another occasion to offer
some more developed thoughts on the theme that is perhaps most weakly argued in
the text of The Militia and the Right to Arms: the effect of the Reconstruction
Amendments - and in particular, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth on the meaning of the Second Amendment. Mr. Merkel, the younger of
us, especially wants to make it known that he intends on another occasion to deal
further with the most provocative issues raised by our critics. For the moment,
* H. Richard Uviller, Arthur Levitt Professor of Law at Columbia University, A.B.,
Harvard University, 1951, LL.B, Yale University, 1953; William G.Merkel, Associate in
Law at Columbia University, J.D. Columbia University 1996. The authors wish to express
their particular gratitude to Professor Saul Cornell of the Ohio State University Department
of History for general encouragement and for expert advice about Pennsylvania politics
during the late 1780s. Special thanks are due to Saul for letting us consult draft versions of
two articles, A New Paradigm for Second Amendment, now published in 22 LAW & HIST.
REv. 161 (2004), and Beyond the Myth of Consensus: The Struggle to Define the Right to
BearArms in the Early Republic, soon to appear in BEYOND THE FOUNDERS (Univ. of North
Carolina Press, forthcoming 2004).
1 H. RICHARD UviLxER & WILUAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS,
OR, How THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002).
2 A third participant in this forum, Professor Randy Barnett of Boston University Law
School, withdrew his comment after he read our reply thereto. Professor Barnett did,
however, post his comment on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN). See Randy E.
Barnett, Is the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on a Militia?, 1 (2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Boston University School of Law Working Paper
Series, Public Law & Legal Theory, No. 03-12), available at http://papers.ssm.om/ sol3/
delivery.cfm/SSRNL1D42098 1_code030716570.pdf?abstractid=420981 (last visited Feb. 22,
2004). Our reply to that comment is also posted on the SSRN, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=509295.
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these somewhat scattered reactions will have to do, and we sincerely hope that our
commentators will understand that neither our cursory comments, nor our disparate
detail of reply intends any disrespect for the thoughtful reviews that our critics gave
our work.
PROFESSOR SANFORD LEVINSON
Let us first say a few words in response to Professor Sanford Levinson,
according him the primacy he deserves as the (proud) father of Second Amendment
scholarship. We are grateful for the many appreciative comments he offered. We
never expected that we could quote praise from Levinson on the cover of the book,
which contains scant praise for his seminal work. His comments here make it clear
where our paths of understanding diverge. But before we get to that, a couple of
smaller matters.
First, we hope that in his opening, Professor Levinson does not mean to suggest
that we are arguing backwards from a political stance on gun control to the most
compatible constitutional construction. We know he does not mean to include us
among those who favor what he calls "weak emanations" from the Second
Amendment because we favor gun control.' We have studiously declined to take
a position on the advisability of strict gun control because we do not view the issue
as affected by constitutional construction. So, Sandy, please do not lump us with
the strict-gun-control bunch, who recognize only "weak emanations" from the
Second. We do not care whether states or the federal government choose strict or
lax gun laws; we say only the choice is theirs. Far from insisting that the Founders
control contemporary policy toward guns, our whole thesis is that whatever the
Founders would have thought about unlicenced automatic weapons, it does not
matter since their underlying interest in a strong militia is no longer pertinent to the
debate."
Second, we must address the matter of"originalism." As Levinson recognizes,
we are not orthodox originalists.s We respect precedent (up to a point), and we do
not think that the First Amendment today means precisely what it did in the
eighteenth century. But (with a few notable - and controversial - exceptions) we
read the development of our understanding of the major provisions of the Bill of
Rights, and the concomitant adjustments of "meaning," as within the framework of
the original contemplation. Sure, the framers did not conceive of electronic
surveillance, or search by thermal imaging, but they knew what eavesdropping was,
' See Sanford Levinson, Superb History, Dubious Constitutional and Political Theory,
Comments on Uviller andMerkel, The Militia and the Right to Arms, 12 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 315 (2004).
UViLER & MERKEL, supra note 1, at 24,227-29.
See Levinson, supra note 3, at 321.
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and they used the word "unreasonable" at the heart of the Fourth Amendment- a
word they surely knew was subject to reinterpretation with the changing times. But
there is no way that changing times or the demands of post-bellum reconstruction
could sever the link in the Second Amendment between the right to arms and the
service of private arms to the necessity of a well-regulated militia. The fact that
Chief Justice Taney in the infamous Dred Scott decision - and perhaps others in
that era along with him - thought that the privileges and immunities of federal
citizenship referred to the private right to unrestricted arms for personal use affords
little help in understanding the Fourteenth Amendment.6
We might even agree with Professor Akhil Amar (Levinson's ally on this) 7 that
incorporation of the injunctions against federal abuse should be obligatory on the
state governments through the Privileges and Immunities Clause, but the law is that
due process, not privileges and immunities, is the vehicle of incorporation.8 And
presumably Levinson, and those who respect stare decisis, are not eager to reargue
this issue. It is surely awkward - to the point of straining even Taney's
jurisprudence - to contend that the right to carry personal weapons for personal
use is so clearly implicit in the concept of ordered liberty as to be ranked as
fundamental, as required by Cardozo's test in Palko v. Connecticut for
incorporation through the Due Process Clause.9 Perhaps that is why the Second
Amendment remains one of the very few that are not binding on the states - a
point that Amar and Levinson ignore in arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment
rewrote the Second.
But basically (to come to the main point in contention between us), Levinson
is right when he says that we have given short shrift to the theory that the
constitutional reconfiguration of the Reconstruction Era radically altered the
meaning of the Second Amendment. 0 It is not, as Levinson suggests, that we are
in love with the amendment provision" - though we do honor the Founders for
having recognized that their constitution was not immutable, and for providing the
orderly means for its revision. We readily recognize the implicit amendment of
most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights by the adoption of the Reconstruction
Amendments.
And it is not that we fail to see the need for personal arms and self-protection
among the recently emancipated slaves under attack by militant and aggressive
6 See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393,416-17 (1856) (contending that the Framers
did not intend to allow slaves and free blacks to "carry arms wherever they went"); see also
Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637, 651 (1989)
(discussing Taney's opinion in Dred Scott).
See Levinson, supra note 3, at 329.
8 Uvi.ER & MERKEL, supra note 1, at 204-05.
9 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
'0 See Levinson, supra note 3, at 325-28.
n Id.
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whites. Perhaps it was time to repeal or supercede the militia amendment (already
largely inoperative) with a clear provision guaranteeing unrestricted access for
personal arms for self-protection. We do not think that was done, nor indeed
seriously contemplated. And we think it imaginative, but not persuasive, for law
professors, some 135 years later (when the world has changed again), to tell us that
the proper construction of this eighteenth-century relic is the reading it should have
been accorded in the immediate wake of the nation's most catastrophic war.
We hope our understanding does not merit the appellation "historical amnesia"
for our failure to recognize what Amar and Levinson claim is the "general
understanding" that the Second Amendment became "far more 'individualist' in
1868 than it was in 1791 - and indeed that this general understanding dictates its
meaning to the present day. 2 Levinson is right to stress that between the War of
1812 and the end of Reconstruction respectable persons articulated a private-
sounding right to arms of a sort endorsed only by fringe radicals during the period
of the founding.
To be sure, we dispute the assertion that their voices became dominant.
Consider, for instance, the militia-focused entry on the Second Amendment in
Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 3 or the Tennessee
Supreme Court's militia-focused reading of the right to arms in State v. Aymette,14
or even St. George Tucker's comments on the right to arms," which, we think, fit
more naturally into our militia-centered paradigm than into a private-right model.
Levinson is right also to point out that we can not rely solely on the meaning
ascribed to constitutional language in 1789 or 1791 to determine the meaning of the
same text today.'6 As he correctly notes, the First Amendment today prevents state
and federal action (for instance, enforcement of defamation judgments in favor of
maligned public figures where neither intent nor recklessness as to the untruth of
the matters published has been established) that was not deemed prohibited to the
federal government when the Amendment was ratified in 1791.'
Our point about the meaning of the Second Amendment is, however, stronger,
and altogether different. The text of the Amendment expressly links the right to
arms to the militia. The linkage endures, for the text has not been modified. The
constitutionally specified militia, however, is no more. The unorganized militia
12 Id. at 328.
13 See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 1, at 30-31 (discussing JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTMrrION OF THE UNITED STATES 607-08 (2d ed. 1851)
(1833)).
"4 Id. at 27 (discussing State v. Aymette, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840)).
t ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WrTH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO
THE CoNsTrrunoN AND LAW OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF
ViRGINiA289 (1803).
"6 See Levinson, supra note 3, at 329.
17 Id.
[Vol. 12:357
2004] THE AUTHORS' REPLY TO COMMENTARIES AND CRITICISMS 361
exists on the statute books, but it has not made muster since before the Civil War. 8
No one now alive has either served in the general militia, nor been fined for
nonattendance. The organized militia, meanwhile, has been called by another name
(The National Guard) since 1903, and it bears no resemblance to the institution
linked to the right to arms in the Bill of Rights. 9 It is not universal, service in it is
not compelled, it is not privately armed, and it is no longer distinct from the regular
Army. Until the well-regulated militia of the Second Amendment is restored, we
maintain, the right to arms enshrined in the Constitution has no scope for
application.
This brings us squarely back to the point that probably most concerned each of
the commentators whose pieces are reprinted here, which is that in the years since
the right to arms was enshrined in the Constitution many persons have expressed
their faith in a right to arms wholly unconnected to the militia. Indeed, in 1866
those persons included Congressman John Bingham and Senator Jacob Howard, the
Republican managers of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Their voices, Professor Levinson maintains (as, indeed, does Professor Amar),
suggest strongly the intent of the nation to write a private, non-militia-focused right
to arms in the post-Civil War constitutional order.20 Though we certainly plan to
say a great deal more on this point in the future, we think our essential Fourteenth
Amendment rejoinder worth reasserting. The claim that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, though it says nothing about the
Bill of Rights, was designed and understood to apply the Bill of Rights against the
states is a bold one. In both the House and Senate debates, some members listed
elements of the Bill of Rights (sometimes including the right to arms, sometimes
including a private- sounding right to arms) among privileges and immunities,2 but
others (perhaps more) insisted that privileges and immunities referred only to civil
rights - that is to say in nineteenth-century parlance economic liberties, such as the
right to contract, to travel, to sue and be sued, to practice a trade.22 Even granting
the possibility of an occasional Ackermanian reworking of the Constitution outside
the procedures specified in Article V, the constitutional requirements that official
new amendments be ratified by two-thirds of each House of Congress and three-
fourths ofthe states (either in convention or through their legislatures) remain worth
emphasizing respecting the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, because unlike
the reinterpretation of the Constitution that accompanied the New Deal, the
18 UvLLER&MERKEL, supra note 1, at 125-32.
'9 Id. at 132-44.
'0 Id. at 204 (discussing Amar's perspective on the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges and Immunities Clause).
21 Id. at 197-200.
2' Id.; see also RAOULBERGER, GOVERNIIENTBY JUDICLARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 30-69 (2d ed. 1997).
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reshaping of the Constitution affected during Reconstruction did find formal
expression. Since we did get tangible new constitutional text in 1866-1868 -text
that says nothing about the Bill of Rights, the right to arms, or designs to alter the
meaning of the Second Amendment - it hardly seems unfair to ask those who
would read the Fourteenth Amendment to constitutionalize a private right to arms
to demonstrate that two-thirds of the members of each House in 1866 and a majority
of the ratifiers in three-quarters of the states from 1866 to 1868 understood the
Amendment to create a constitutional right to have and to hold guns for all and any
lawful purposes. Needless to say, to this point, neither Amar, Levinson, nor
ourselves have counted the heads, but unless Saul Cornell does so first, we propose
to do precisely that as soon as we can find the time. It is our strong suspicion that
the head count will show that no constitutional majority in favor of the Amar/
Levinson position existed.
Our other major point of contention with Professor Levinson concerns the
ultimate political question, that is, the right to revolution against the established
government, or, perhaps even against the established constitutional order (these
being generally distinct issues). In our book, we took issue with Levinson's linkage
of the Second Amendment to the Lockean right to resistance, and argued that the
Constitution of 1788 had relegated that right into obsolescence.2 But as Levinson
points out in this forum, "[i]t is hard to believe that a generation that had exercised
just such a right - many of them finding intellectual sustenance in John Locke and
his apparent support of a revolutionary'appeal to heaven' - had completely turned
their back on the right's legitimacy." 24 It is indeed counterintuitive to believe that
the Americans who had fought the Revolution had by 1789/ 1791 disowned their
own tradition.
But it is less difficult to conceive that the majority of them decided that they
could not envision a legitimate revolution against the new order they had
established after their Revolution. After all, these same people by and large - or
at least those of them old enough to have thought about such things before the
Revolution of 1776 - once thought of the Constitution of 1689 as permanent and
immune from revolutionary challenge, and, indeed, many of them had taken up arms
in 1775 precisely because they felt justified in restoring that constitution then
imperiled in its operations on the western side of the Atlantic by the overreaching
of ministers at Whitehall and parliamentarians at Westminster. Having fought what
began as a revolution to restore the old constitution that had been deemed fixed,
perpetual, and secure all their lives, it seems not improbable that Americans would
be able to endorse in principle a new constitutional order that was at least in theory
perfected against corruption from above and below, and hence immune to
revolution.
23 Id. at 170-78.
24 Levinson, supra note 3, at 318.
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But nothing lasts forever, these same Americans might have observed, looking
back on the tumultuous twenty-seven years spanning the Sugar Act and ratification
of the Bill of Rights. And so change and challenge might come even to the new
constitutional order, but not for "light and transient causes. " ' Here then, we think,
is the point where wejoin debate with Professor Levinson: when, and at what level,
do causes for revolution become sufficiently heavy and persistent to trigger the
ultimate remedy? Does the Second Amendment contain an implied failsafe to
invoke if the constitutionally specified remedies of Articles I through VII should
falter? Or, does it merely represent another check and balance that makes such
failure all the more improbable, remote, and unthinkable (i.e., by making
dependence on a dangerous standing army less likely)?
Our answer remains that this question need only be reached when all those
constitutional remedies (and with them the Constitution itself) should have ceased
to operate, at which point, by definition, the Second Amendment would too have
been overcome or supplanted in the crisis of the old order and the coming of the
new. In other words, this is on one (very practical) level a question that cannot be
reached while the system of constitutional law we discuss here continues in
operation. But it is a question, like so many others raised in Levinson's famous
article and in his current comment, that merits much further reflection and
discussion.
PROFESSOR JONATHAN SIMON
Professor Simon believes, along with Yale's Bruce Ackerman, that Article V
of our Constitution is not the exclusive means for amending that charter.2 The
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, they point out, was transmuted during the
New Deal, as a response to changing circumstances and the urgent demands of the
people.27 The result was a new constitution that recognized a redefined
government - and certainly, a redefined executive branch.
Simon agrees with us about the meaning of the right to arms set down in the Bill
of Rights in 1789.2" That right, Simon accepts, was originally understood to be
linked to the militia, and to have no application in purely private situations such as
sport shooting or individual self-defense. But Simon argues, since at least the
1960s, growing numbers of Americans have seen the right to arms rather differently
2 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
2 Jonathon Simon, Gun Rights and the Constitutional Significance of Violent Crime, 12
WM. & MARY BEL LRTS. J. 335 (2004).
" See id. at 336-39.
's See id. at 335 ("For the framers of the [Second] Amendment and the generation of
Americans who ratified the Constitution, the possession of firearms had constitutional
significance, but only insofar as it served to sustain the unique institution of state militias as
a vital part of the defense of the new nation.").
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than did their militia-focused ancestors.29 In large part, Simon quite plausibly
suggests, this changed perception reflects the nation's contemporary fixation with
the danger of violent crime, and the perceived need of citizens to defend themselves
privately when and where the police cannot or do not do so. Simon is also on the
money when he asserts that, for many of the people for whom these concerns loom
most important, the Second Amendment has become a cherished icon. On these
points it is difficult to disagree with Simon.
Where we part company is on the constitutional significance of this social
concern. That those who fear crime look to the Second Amendment to guarantee
them access to weapons does not convert the meaning of that provision to
accommodate their most urgent demand. Unlike Professor Simon, we resist the idea
that the Constitution bends to reflect the wishes of even a majority of the citizens
(and we have difficulty knowing what the majority want from the Constitution with
regard to free access to handguns). The majority (if such it is) must follow the
amendment procedure - a device, which both by its availability and the difficulty
of its use, contributes to the stability of our government. And to those (and Simon
is one) who call upon the example of the New Deal and assert that judicial
interpretation of the Second Amendment, like that of the Commerce Clause, may
be adjusted to reflect contemporary needs, we say that the Commerce Clause is a
very different animal from the Second Amendment. The Commerce Clause, found
in the all-encompassing Article I, Section 8, provides simply that, among its other
powers, "Congress shall have Power... [to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes...."'0
Regulating commerce may take many forms, and it was no great stretch for the
court to approve legislation that regulated interstate commerce by imposing
restrictions on unfair labor practices." By contrast, the Second Amendment -
today no less than in 1791 - couples the right to keep and bear arms to the
indispensability of a military organization known as the militia. To eradicate that
interdependence, we claim, requires the arduous amendment process; it can not be
accomplished by the relatively easy device of judicial "interpretation" or
"reinterpretation." And certainly the clear and explicit language of the Second
Amendment has not been magically transmuted to an altogether different
entitlement simply by the prevalence of frightened people who would like to have
a constitutional argument against restrictive federal and local efforts to limit access
to guns.
Id. at 339.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
3' See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most salient theme joining the comments and rejoinders of this
forum and the participants' earlier presentations at the William and Mary
Conference of February, 2003 concerns the Second Amendment's continuing,
altered, or abated relevance in the modem world. Jonathon Simon has argued that
fear of crime and loss of faith in law enforcement lent the right to arms renewed
meaning in the last years of the twentieth century. For Sanford Levinson, the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment altered the character of the right to arms,
rendering what was once a civic entitlement much more liberal and individualistic.
To others, the constitutional right to arms has always had a private dimension, and
in that capacity, the right endures to this very day.32 In The Militia and the Right
to Arms and in our remarks here, we have argued that the disappearance of the well-
regulated militia envisioned by the Framers and memorialized in the Second
Amendment has sapped the right to arms of meaning and application - at least
until such time as state or federal governments restore a militia bearing some of the
defining attributes of the militia known to the framers: qualities such as universal
rather than selective membership, compulsory rather than voluntary service, the
availability of sanctions to enforce participation and compliance with regulations,
individual responsibility (perhaps with government assistance) for equipment and
arms, and an identity clearly distinct from that of the regular Army.
While the constitutional right to arms has become, in our analysis, inoperative,
there is another sense in which we think the values behind the Second Amendment
retain a curious and vital currency. The anti-Federalists who lobbied so hard to
preserve the citizen militias as a bulwark against a dangerous standing army were
animated by Republican principles. Their most extreme fear was that a federal
army, answerable to a Caesarist president, would dissolve Congress and the state
governments and institute dictatorial rule. But the Republicans had many palpable
worries that stopped short of so grave a perversion of constitutional governance.
They - and many moderates in the First Congress - feared that access to a
massive federal army would tempt governments to empire building. They feared
that entanglement in overseas wars would be expensive, that it would lead to
profiteering, deficit spending, and to creeping debt that would drain the exchequer
and enfeeble the nation. They feared that the resulting system of debt-servicing
financed by borrowing and taxation would lead to corruption, to government
dependency on wrongheaded men and measures. They feared that irresponsible
leaders with access to armies would be tempted to bid for glory by starting wars that
did not serve legitimate defensive ends. They feared that a Congress full of
placemen and dependent members would yield up their powers too readily to the
32 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 2.
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president, and place no obstacles in the path of his martial dreams. And they feared
that unchecked federal control over the citizen soldiery would lead to coerced
deployment in oppressive campaigns far from family and community. Historians
have long debated whether these Republicans were paranoid or prescient. For a
decade at least, the historical pendulum has swung against the soundness of the
Republican vision, but in recent months, the Republicans' misgivings have lost
some of their former quaintness.
